11 June 2026
Morning assurance contributions and afternoon AI security contributions are presented and discussed in Sapanca.
Event record / ASF 2026
Event record
From the forum to working publications: evidence-based assurance and vulnerability management in an AI era.
After-event video
Four minutes of conversations, perspectives and the day in Sapanca.
English captions are automatically generated and not human-certified. Read the transcript
The day
How can trust be shown with evidence: first for assurance, then for vulnerability management once AI changes the pace.
Six specialist contributions and an executive panel followed the assurance question from incident evidence to engineering transparency.
The afternoon examined how AI changes attack, discovery and defence.
Published programme · local event time. Times are local to Sapanca, Türkiye, on 11 June 2026.
What the forum surfaced
Public themes drawn from the two final publications. They are not attributed to any speaker or organisation.
Technical weaknesses and governance gaps together account for about seventy per cent of incident drivers; two of the largest recent outages involved no attacker at all.
France’s SecNumCloud meets its sovereignty goals through testable technical requirements: control matters more than country of origin.
When results are portable, verifiable, comparable and independent of the laboratory, a product can be tested once and trusted in many markets.
The practical problem is not a lack of requirements but systems and controls that exist on paper without being used.
Deep engineering transparency has worked in production, but it is costly and depends on real preconditions.
Combine exposure prevention (governance, standards, secure design) with exposure reduction (faster detection, prioritisation, patching, automated countermeasures).
AI helps triage the rising volume of vulnerability reports, but findings still need careful human filtering.
No single entity can defend against AI-driven attacks in isolation; vendors, operators and the wider ecosystem must collaborate.
Because large language models are probabilistic, independent guardrails and a dedicated AI security control layer are needed.
Asset identification, risk assessment, patch approval and final governance decisions stay under human oversight.
“Assurance is defined by what is tested, not by who makes the product.”Quoted in the Assurance Manual, section 1 · speaker not named
From event to publication
The publications are not minutes. They are syntheses prepared by Global Digital Foundation from the forum evidence and wider industry perspectives.
Morning assurance contributions and afternoon AI security contributions are presented and discussed in Sapanca.
The morning evidence supports a risk-based, evidence-centric approach. The four-level assurance ladder was not proposed at the forum; it is a synthesis offered as a considered contribution.
The forum did not aim to agree a formal framework. The paper offers an initial contribution to the discussion, intended to invite further input.
Two working groups carry the themes forward between gatherings. Taking the work to HCE, a Blueprint around MWC 2027 and ASF 2027 in France are planned.

Outcome · morning track
A practical approach to trust grounded in evidence: define what is being assured, make the evidence inspectable, and sustain assurance through the system lifecycle.

Outcome · afternoon track
A working framework for vulnerability discovery, validation and response in an AI era, with risk-based prioritisation, human oversight and service continuity.
Participant feedback
Aggregate results of the voluntary post-event survey. They describe the respondents, not all participants.
28 voluntary responses from 58 participants. Multiple selections allowed for topics; percentages describe respondents, not all participants. No individual responses or contact details are published.
Sources
The two final publications, the published programme and the after-event video.